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One of the main reasons for introducing a formal language is to remove ambiguity,
the possibility of assigning several meanings to a linguistic expression. Typically, this is
achieved through ensuring unique readability of formulas by using brackets (or another
convention, such as Polish notation). Unique readability implies meaning uniqueness,
exactly one valuation of a sentence given an interpretation of basic formulas and recur-
sive truth conditions. Obviously, in natural language this one-to-one correspondence
between syntax and semantics is absent, the unique readability assumption does not
hold true universally. Whereas e.g. scope ambiguities in natural languages have been
studied extensively, ambiguous formal languages have not been the focus of in depth
research. Here, we lift the assumption of unique readability by omitting the brackets
from propositional logic, making it possible to formally distinguish between syntactic
and semantic ambiguity. A valuation then amounts to a semantic disambiguation, and
rather than a unique valuation (truth value), there is a set of valuations corresponding
to ways a formula could have been constructed. We show what happens to familiar
concepts of logic such as definability, satisfiability and validity. Here follows two simple
examples illustrating the relation between syntactic and semantic ambiguity. In some
cases unique readability can be regained through careful construction of formulas. E.g.,
although an attempt to define p → q as ¬p ∨ q would be syntactically and semanti-
cally ambiguous, one may define it as q ∨ ¬p, which can be read only one way (but
obviously this construction is not stable under substitution). Syntactic ambiguity does
not imply semantic ambiguity, although it is typically the case. For instance, although
the formula p ∧ ¬p ∧ p can be read in three ways, it has only one possible meaning (a
contradiction).
